📝 The two scores are 0.25 apart on a 10-point scale, which is inside the noise of a ten-day-old pair. That closeness is the finding, not a failure of the method: these are the same product with one input changed, and most of the framework agrees. A separate six-factor PM Weighted Score — value, quality, growth, momentum, sentiment, risk — is reported in the companion markdown and lands at 4.8 for FUSY and 4.6 for FGLY, confirming the same ordering and the same near-tie.

📝 What is real and what is presentational. The fee, the option leg, the launch date, the manager, the wrapper and the distribution frequency are all identical, and the tie on the ongoing charge shows it rather than manufacturing a winner. The three real differences are the geography (1.72% against 26.00% outside North America), the concentration that follows from it (49.2% against 39.67%), and the volatility that decides how much premium each fund can plausibly sell (12.65% against 11.86%). The last one runs the opposite way to the first two: FGLY is the better-balanced portfolio and the worse premium engine.

📝 Holdings as at 9 October 2026, single source for both funds, so the comparison is like-for-like. The structural finding is the regional table rather than the holdings table: MSCI World is 72.94% United States by construction (1,249 constituents across 23 developed markets, MSCI, 30 Sep 2026) and MSCI states it accounts for roughly 90% of the MSCI ACWI index — so the missing 10% is the entire emerging-market universe. FGLY is not a diversification product in the sense the name implies. It is FUSY with about 26 points of developed ex-North-America equity attached, and it holds 13.20% of its assets in an index call written against an index that is itself three-quarters American.

📝 The structural conclusion this table supports. FGLY is the calmer index and the better-balanced portfolio, and on the underlying alone it is the marginally better risk-adjusted holding (Sharpe 1.36 against 1.32). But both funds exist to do one thing — sell call options and pay out the premium — and premium is a function of the volatility of what is being sold against. MSCI World has been less volatile than MSCI USA over three years, five years and ten years, by a consistent 0.7–0.8 percentage points. All else equal, that points to FGLY distributing less than FUSY for the same 0.35% fee and the same 13.2% option notional. “All else equal” is doing real work there: the strike policy, the roll schedule and the position sizing are not published for either fund, so this is an expectation drawn from index characteristics, not an observed payout. It is the strongest directional claim available at ten days, and it is not a certainty.

Both funds state the same objective: long-term capital growth and enhanced income. Neither grows capital by doing anything unusual — it owns an equity portfolio. The income half is a derivative position, and that is the part worth understanding, because it is the part with no published details.

Take a £100 fund: £87 in equities, call options written on £13 of index notional, strike set 5% above the starting level, premium of about 0.5% of notional collected each month (£0.07). This is an illustration of the mechanic, not these funds’ disclosed parameters — neither publishes strike, notional basis or premium.

✅ That is the whole product in two months. In the strong month the holder captures about 93% of the upside; in the quiet month about 104% of it. The small months come slightly more frequent; the big months come rarely and the surrender is larger. The holder is being paid to be there in the calm and is being paid — in foregone upside — to hold on through the storm. That is a real trade with a real price, and it is not a free yield.

Three things follow, and all three matter:

1. The distribution is not a portfolio yield. It is the premium stream from a ~13% derivative position, plus roughly 1.5–2% of ordinary dividends from the equity book. Reading a 7% distribution as “the portfolio pays 7%” is the single most common misreading of this product type.
2. Neither fund discloses the payoff. No strike, no notional basis, no roll schedule, no premium earned. Ed Thorp’s cell in the expert panel says “unauditable” for exactly this reason, and the gap is identical in both funds.
3. Roll cost is a real, unquantified drag. A futures leg has to be rolled periodically, and futures can trade at a premium or a discount to the spot index. That cost is inside the ~0.9% of annual transaction costs in FUSY’s KID, and it is not broken out anywhere.

✅ Why this matters for the FUSY-versus-FGLY question specifically. Premium scales with the volatility of whatever is being written against. MSCI World has been the calmer index over three, five and ten years by a consistent 0.7–0.8 percentage points. Same 0.35% fee, same ~13% notional, calmer index — which points to FGLY collecting less premium over the same year than FUSY. The strike policy and roll schedule are unpublished in both, so this is an expectation drawn from index characteristics rather than an observed payout, and it is the single most decision-relevant inference in this report.

📝 Eleven of seventeen rows are identical, and the two that matter most for a reader choosing between them — the fee and the option notional — are among them. What separates the funds is one input, the benchmark, and everything else in this table is a consequence of it. Both funds were seeded with $5m from Susquehanna, an authorised participant, at launch; neither has published its own assets under management since. A $5m seed is a normal way to bring an ETF to market and a live closure risk on the same page.

📝 Score: both funds pass 2, watch 4, fail 2, unknown 2 — identical, item for item. That is the correct result and it is unusual. When a checklist is run across two products from the same range, same wrapper, same fee and same launch date, the structure cannot separate them, because structure is not where the difference lives. The difference lives entirely in the benchmark, and the benchmark is fully disclosed. Of the two open items, the unhedged currency exposure is genuinely worse in FGLY — 26% of the fund is in non-dollar assets.

📝 The panel’s most important result is how little it has to say. Thirteen of the seventeen scorable masters score the two funds identically, and the means come out within 0.05 of each other — 4.29 and 4.24. That is not a failure of the framework; it is the framework correctly reporting that these are the same product. Every master whose lens depends on the engine (Sosnoff on premium, Thorp on the payoff, Gundlach on manufactured yield, Taleb on convexity, Klarman and Graham on margin of safety) has nothing to grip, because the engine is identical to within 0.04 percentage points of notional. The three masters that moved are the three that care about what the fund is for rather than how it works: diversification, product naming, and whether the label matches the portfolio.

Score column reads FUSY / FGLY. Fifteen rows are shown rather than twenty because Burry, Damodaran and Ackman are N/A in both funds and the two remaining cross-over masters carry identical scores in both; the full twenty are scored in the table above and in the companion markdown. Bar colour follows the FUSY cell.

📝 These are the indexes, not the funds — they are shown because they are the only return evidence available and because they set the ceiling on what either fund can do before the overlay. MSCI USA has out-returned MSCI World over one, three, five and ten years, by 1.3 to 1.9 percentage points a year. That is the same fact as the volatility table, seen from the other side: the US index is both higher-returning and higher-volatility, and a call-writing fund wants the volatility. Bars are scaled within this block; the amber/green split is absent because there are no distributions to split.

📝 The cost finding is the one place where the sibling comparison is not a tie. Both funds charge 0.35%. But FUSY’s KID puts total cost of ownership near 1.3%, with roughly 0.9% of it annual transaction costs from continually rolling the option book. FGLY has the same 0.35% OCF and an almost identical 13.2% futures leg, so its transaction-cost load should be in the same region — but that is an inference from a matching cost structure, not a read of FGLY’s own KID, which was not reachable. The dashed track is deliberate: printing a 1.3% on the FGLY bar would be a guess dressed as a measurement. Peer figures from an independent aggregator and issuer pages, 9–11 Oct 2026.

Underlying figures are actual MSCI index outcomes. Fund figures are strategy-level estimates for a large-cap equity book writing index calls — no backtest exists for either fund.

Across three of the four scenarios FGLY is the softer fund: less concentrated, less American, and in 2008 and 2022 that difference is worth one to two percentage points. In the fourth — the calm-market regime that is the actual point of the strategy — it is the weaker one, because the premium it has to sell starts from a lower base. Neither fund has lived through any of these regimes, and the estimates are the analyst’s, not the funds’.

📝 What would change this assessment — stated as evidence conditions. The first monthly distributions from either fund would convert the volatility inference into an observed payout rate, and the gap between them would settle whether the 0.7–0.8 point volatility differential actually shows up in cash. FGLY’s KID would establish whether its all-in cost matches FUSY’s ~1.3% or sits below it. A published options disclosure — notional, strike policy, roll schedule, premium earned — would let the payoff be computed rather than inferred, and would be the single most informative disclosure either fund could make. Fund sizes at a second and third quarter would retire or confirm the closure question for both.